



# Effects of Government Initiatives on Youth Crime

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# Overview

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# Objectives

1. To evaluate the effects of both a crime-targeted and an indirect UK government initiative on crime reduction.
2. To enable government to consider external benefits in their trade-off between expenditure and effectiveness of policies.



# Framework

- Why do we expect an effect education on crime?
- From participation in education:
  - Future earnings
  - Parenting (long-term benefits)
  - Pleasure (time & peer group selection)
  - Patience & risk aversion



# Direct Government Initiative

- Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI)
- Home Office initiative introduced in 1999 aim to reduce burglary in worst areas of England & Wales.
- £25m were given in direct support to police force areas; 63 projects £60k each approx.



# Indirect Government Initiative

- The Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) programme
  - Income support (£30-40 a week) to increase post-16 participation in education
  - Eligibility: household income < £20 (£30 in London)
  - Pilot in 15 LEAs in 1999
  - Rolled over to 1/3 of LEAs in 2001




# Method & Data

- Of 15 EMA pilots, 7 also received RBI support, 5 only RBI.
- Use area level information to investigate crime reduction in areas with both initiatives, EMA only RBI only against the rest of the LEAs.
- Crime indicator: male juvenile convictions for burglary (16 to 18 year olds)



# Trends in Convictions for Male Burglary

PANEL A: EMA versus Non-treated LEAs



—▲— other LEAs    - - - ● - - - EMA areas  
regression line pre & post EMA introduction fit through data points

Data source: OI



# Results

Table 3. Difference-in-differences in burglary for EMA, RBI, and EMA-RBI areas

|                           | Whole Sample         |                      | Exclude<br>1998-9  | Exclude<br>1999     | Matched<br>Sample   |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                           | (1)                  | (2)                  | (3)                | (4)                 | (5)                 |
| $T_{EMA}$ *policy-on      | -0.916<br>(0.557)    | -0.825<br>(0.563)    | -0.782<br>(0.775)  | -0.746<br>(0.730)   | -1.120<br>(0.508)** |
| $T_{RBI}$ *policy-on      | -0.666<br>(0.303)**  | -0.531<br>(0.278)*   | -0.828<br>(0.426)* | -0.603<br>(0.325)*  | --                  |
| $T_{EMA-RBI}$ *policy-on  | -1.726<br>(0.615)*** | -1.424<br>(0.522)*** | -1.590<br>(0.911)* | -1.352<br>(0.655)** | -1.259<br>(0.521)** |
| <b>Controls</b>           |                      |                      |                    |                     |                     |
| Area fixed effects        | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                 |
| Time-varying<br>variables | No                   | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                 |
| Yearly controls           | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                 |
| Cohort controls           | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                 |
| R-Squared                 | 0.51                 | 0.53                 | 0.55               | 0.54                | 0.65                |
| Number of areas           | 132                  | 132                  | 132                | 132                 | 18                  |
| Sample size               | 2,772                | 2,772                | 1,977              | 2,376               | 378                 |



# Sensitivity

- Results do not hold for 19 to 21 year olds
- Results do not hold for older age groups
- Results hold when we exclude areas where the EMA was rolled over in 2001.



# Conclusions

- Between 1996 and 1999 areas that introduced both the RBI and the EMA had an average of 2.9 more convictions for burglary per 1,000 pupils than other LEAs.
- After the programmes were introduced burglary fell by between 1.1 and 1.5 convictions per 1,000 pupils over the three years relative to areas where these programmes were not introduced.
- Therefore, educational policies might complement direct interventions.



# Cont...

- We have not addressed the issue of how the two programmes might have interacted in terms of programme delivery, selection of areas, or of individual level incentives and behaviours.
- Nonetheless, our findings highlight the potential importance of connections between interventions designed and delivered by different government departments.

